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Abstract
　This paper specifies the sufficient condition under which both managers and shareholders of the firm 
are all better off by agreeing with the intercorporate shareholding contract commonly observed in the 
Japanese capital market.  The model describes an agency setting where reciprocal ownership plays an 
explicit role as anti-takeover device, but there is no exogenous means of making managers act in 
shareholders’ best interest without external takeover threats.  In particular, assuming that sales persistence 
and revenue allocation between managers and shareholders varies with the firm’s strategy, the model 
shows that (i) to reach unanimity in the intercorporate shareholding contract, managers have to commit to 
always keeping shareholders’ gain greater than that under managerial entrenchment, and (ii) managers 
can increase equity position in the firm and thereby receive a significant part of the incremental gain even 
after deviating from managerial entrenchment, that compensates for some of the deprived private benefits. 
The findings provide some implications for the manner in which accounting information facilitates 
shareholders’ assessment of the firm in the presence of agency conflicts. 
I　Introduction
　The Japanese corporate governance system is distinctly characterized by intercorporate shareholding 
which often extends to different industries and ties the member firms with a web of reciprocal share 
holdings.  Equity position held by stable owners is believed to serve preventing potential raiders from 
conducting hostile takeovers.  There are two contrary views as to the effects of the existence of 
intercorporate shareholding1).  Those who support the efficiency of mutual shareholding argue that 
removing the takeover threats enables managers to devote themselves to long-term value maximizing 
activities and thus managerial myopia ceases.  Prior works along this line involves Osano (1996) and 
Arikawa and Kato (2004).  While the former explores subgame perfect equilibrium in which all agents 
improve their welfare by agreeing with mutual shareholding contracts, the latter demonstrates the 
possibility that managerial private benefits are partially correlated with shareholders’ interests in the 
presence of stable owners.  On the other hand, dissidents contend that because market interference leads 
to an effective monitoring that makes managers always conscious of the profitability of the strategy being 
undertaken, the lack of such monitoring due to the difficulty of takeovers insulates managers from 
pursuing shareholders’ interests.  Isagawa (2007) shows an entrenchment model that provides rationale 
for the unwinding of intercorporate shareholding, consistent with the phenomenon after an array of 
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economic reforms in the 1990s.  A somewhat different approach is taken by Clayton et al.  (2005) who 
suggest that in a duopoly setting, whether mutual shareholding leads to amelioration of the firm 
performance crucially depends on the complementarities between each firm’s products released to the 
market. 
　The purpose of this paper is to extend Osano’s (1996) analytical framework to specify the sufficient 
condition under which the interests of entrenched managers and shareholders coincide: the fundamental 
question relates to what is required for managers to get reciprocal shareholding contract approved by 
shareholders.  The model presented here incorporates a particular set of variables that represents sales 
persistence as well as a revenue allocation rate that indicates how much of sales are substantially under 
management control and allocated discretionally among various stakeholders.  As Aoki (1988) argues, 
bargaining between management and shareholders alters the firm’s strategy through affecting managerial 
objective function with greater focus on sales growth than market value maximization warrants.  Viewed 
like this, intercorporate shareholding is endowed with an explicit role that to some extent eliminates the 
uncertainty of future sales realization via continuous fixated transactions among member firms.  As long as 
the hurdle that hostile takeovers encounter enhances managerial bargaining power over the allocation of 
the firm value, managers exercise discretion in favor of saving as much as they can in the firm.  The less is 
the anticipated shareholders’ gain, the more likely market value of the firm is to fall so that the external 
takeover may occur.  In contrast, the fact that hostile takeovers hardly succeed makes it difficult to find the 
equilibrium where all the agents would become better off under mutual shareholdings. 
　The results obtained here provide insights into how to understand contemporary rapid increase in 
intercorporate shareholdings between Japanese firms that once drastically decreased from 18.5% in 1987 to 
7.6% in 20032).  The profitability of Japanese firms is said to have recovered, but as the uncertainty 
surrounding the firm’s economic environment increases it has become essential for managers to cope with 
the probability that potential raiders may interfere with the firm’s management in case of performance 
deterioration.  Managers are thus required to always keep shareholders’ gain higher than that under 
managerial entrenchment regardless of the economic conditions.  Such requirements are firmly reflected 
in the firms’ commitment to increasing both dividend payments and share repurchases.  Instead of 
surrendering a part of discretion over the value allocation, managers can enjoy the fruit of increased 
shareholder gains by investing more in their own firm’s share.  This alignment effect that stems from the 
reduction of agency costs as argued in the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976) leads to viable 
mutual shareholding contracts. 
　The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II develops a benchmark model for the analysis which 
describes the managers’ strategy in the absence of intercorporate shareholding.  The key is how the 
external takeover threats alter managers’ choice of project so that incumbent managers can avoid losing 
control of the firm.  Section III derives the sufficient conditions under which intercorporate shareholding 
contracts strictly improves the welfare of all agents participating in the market.  In doing so is proven the 
role of managerial ownership in more comprehensive way that binds the classical treatment of agency 
costs with currently disputed emphasis on shareholders’ value maximization.  Finally, section IV presents 
concluding remarks and remaining points to be discussed in finance and/or accounting literature. 
II　The Economy
　The essential ingredients of the model are that consistent with Osano (1996), given the external 
takeover threats, there are ex ante gains to trade shares of those firms whose performance is below the 
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permitted level, and the existence of such gains precludes managerial entrenchment.  Consider a game 
between a firm and a raider, where both agents possess same information about the firm and try to 
maximize their respective utility.  While the raider’s utility function solely consists of the shareholder gain 
from holding the firm’s equity, that of management encompasses not only the cash flow right but private 
benefits from discretionary control right.  To avoid being ousted from the control of the firm, managers 
have to guarantee shareholder gains at least commensurate with the potential return from alternative 
investments.  If external takeover does not occur, managers can derive additional benefits from exploiting 
more of the firm resources, otherwise utilized for maximizing shareholders’ gain.  Two factors entering 
into their utility are cash flow from the ownership of the firm’s equity απaSa,k  and the private benefits 
proportional to resources under managerial control λ(1− πa)Sa,k .  The annual sales Sa,k , conditional on 
the strategy a that is undertaken in the state k, has variance ∆k  that is identically independently 
distributed in each state k.  Higher sales persistence is thus characterized by smaller ∆k .  ¸ is considered 
here within the range of managerial discretion and πa  stands for the revenue allocation rate to 
shareholders ( 0 ≤ λ, πa ≤ 1).  It is assumed that initially the incumbent managers and the potential 
raider hold equity positions of 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5  and β < 0.5  in the firm respectively.  The raider’s gain from 
ownership of the firm is only related to the cash flow rights, βπaSa,k . 
　Before discussing the effects of intercorporate shareholding on the agents’ benefits, this section briefly 
checks the firm’s preference in the choice of the strategy unless reciprocal holding contracts are settled. 
First, the payoff structure of the two distinct strategies k ∈ {M, S}  that management can undertake at 
the beginning of the period is defined symmetrically between the good state g and the bad state b.  The 
nature of the state a ∈ {g, b}  is characterized by the probability σg(σb = 1− σg)  that turns out after the 
strategy sets out.  If managers conduct the strategy M that gives rise to agency costs in that they can 
pursue private benefits λ(1− πM )SM,k  at the cost of shareholders ’ wealth, the firm earns 
RM,g = πM (S +∆M )  in state g and RM,b = πM (S −∆M )  in state b at the end of the period.  The 
counterparts obtained under the shareholder oriented strategy S are RS,g = πS(S +∆S)  in state g and 
RS,b = πS(S −∆S)  in state b.  Note that S is the mean of annual sales identical through all the sets of 
strategy and nature, {a, k}, where a ∈ {g, b}  and k ∈ {M,S}.  It is assumed that the following parameter 
restrictions hold:
　　　　　0 ≤ πM < πS < 2πM , (1)
and
　　　　　　∆M < ∆S . (2)
Assumptions (1) and (2) are straightforward if strategy M warrants managerial entrenchment and aids in 
stabilizing annual sales, where managers are exposed to relatively low risk in the choice of projects and 
can arbitrarily dispose of more revenue for their private purposes than the strategy S takes place.  The 
intuition behind these assumptions is directly derived from the empirical result of Chujo and Yamamoto 
(2005)3).  Also to ensure the possibility that external takeover improves firm performance by switching the 
strategy, the returns described above are put in the following order:
　　　　　RM,b < Rf ≤ RS,b < RM,g < RS,g , (3)
where Rf  represents net cash flow corresponding to risk free charge
4). 
　Provided with the assumptions (1)-(3), lemma 1 below shows that strategy M likely dominates over S 
under the condition of managerial entrenchment. 
Lemma 1.  Given assumptions (1)-(3), a sufficient condition for managers to undertake strategy M under 
the condition that the potential raider does not make external takeover bids is:
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　　　　　 λ
α
≥
(πS − πM )S + (σg − σb) (πS∆S − πM∆M )
(1− πM ) [S + (σg − σb)∆M ]
 (4)
Proof.  If the managers choose strategy M, the payoff of managers GM  is presented by
　　　　　GM = [λ+ (α− λ)πM ](S + (σg − σb)∆M ). 
Similarly, if managers choose strategy S, they are deprived of the private benefits, then the payoff 
attributed to them GS  is
　　　　　GS = απS [S + (σg − σb)∆S ] . 
Taking the difference GM −GS  yields
　　　　　[(1− πM )λ− α(πS − πM )]S + [(1− πM )λ∆M − α(πS∆S − πM∆M )](σg − σb)
　　　　　= [(1− πM )λ− α(πS − πM )][S +∆M (σg − σb)]− απS(∆S −∆M )(σg − σb) . 
The first term in the right-hand side of the equation is the difference between the expectation of removed 
benefits associated with managerial control over revenue allocation and that of incremental revenue claim 
attributable to managers’ own equity ownership.  The second term represents the effects of uncertainty 
increment on management utility, showing that when future prospects are unfavorable, i.e., σg < σb , then 
managers, by choosing strategy M, can hedge the possible losses accruing to their own equity as revenue 
volatility increases.  It is easily confirmed that the left-hand side is always positive if the inequality (4) of 
the lemma holds. 
 Q. E. D. 
The right-hand side of the inequality (4) corresponds to managers’ marginal rate of substitution at which 
managers are willing to choose strategy S in exchange for the private benefits generated by the 
discretionary revenue allocation.  As long as managers’ preference for retaining incumbent control relative 
to earning from their equity position exceeds this rate, the project M remains as an equilibrium strategy. 
　Next, let us introduce a potential raider who has an initial equity ¯ of the firm5).  The addition of external 
takeover threats brings about the change in managerial gains in terms of the risk that the incumbent 
managers may be replaced if the shareholders’ gains fall short of normal returns, i.e., Rf .  The next lemma 
depicts the fact that if external takeovers are viable, managers have to take more risk to maintain their 
entrenchment strategy. 
Lemma 2.  Given assumptions (1)-(3), a sufficient condition for managers to undertake strategy S under the 
condition that the potential raider does make external takeover bids is:
　　　　　 λ
α
<
(πS − πM )S + (πS∆S − πM∆M )
(1− πM ) (S +∆M )
 (5)
Proof.  Similar to the proof of lemma 1, the expected managerial gains from undertaking each strategy are 
derived.  Note that given assumption (3), the external takeover takes place in the bad state when the 
expected returns are smaller than Rf .  If the manager chooses strategy M, now the payoff of managers 
GM   follows as
　　　　　GM  = σg[λ+ (α− λ)πM ](S +∆M ) + σbαπS(S −∆S). 
The change appears in the payoff in case of bad states: because the low return triggers external takeovers 
with incumbent managers replaced, the lack of entrenchment enhances revenue allocation rate albeit in 
face of larger revenue volatility and successfully erases agency costs exploited by the predecessors.  On 
the other hand, there is no change in the payoff to managers undertaking strategy S, that is
　　　　　GS  = GS = απS(S + (σg − σb)∆S) . 
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Again taking the difference GM  −GS   results in
　　　　　 {(1− πM )λ(S +∆M )− α[(πS − πM )S + (πS∆S − πM∆M )]}σg
　　　　　= {[(1− πM )λ− α(πS − πM )](S +∆M )− απS(∆S −∆M )}σg . 
The first term in the right-hand side of the equation represents the difference between incremental 
revenue claim attributable to managers’ own equity ownership and removed benefits associated with 
managerial control over revenue allocation, both weighted by the probability σg .  The second term 
represents managers’ disutility associated with increased uncertainty, whereas the hedge does not work as 
in the case of no takeover threats.  It is easily confirmed that the left-hand side is always negative if the 
inequality (5) of the lemma holds. 
 Q. E. D. 
Somewhat abstract as it appears, the lemma gives intuition for understanding managerial incentives to 
reach at mutual shareholding contracts between familiar firms.  The emphasis should be put on the 
prominent feature of the entrenchment strategy M that stabilizes the firm’s sales revenue and, in turn, 
managemerial gains, in particular beneficial when bad states are anticipated to take place and if this is the 
case, it is determined from the outset that managers are excessively rewarded relative to the risk they 
bear.  To mitigate this inefficiency does the takeover mechanism exist so that it thrusts up the hurdle 
obstacle to taking entrenchment strategies, but with the collusive relationships in complex web of mutual 
shareholdings, the mechanism tends to collapse.  The question addressed in the subsequent section 
concerns if and under what condition the intercorporate shareholding can result in an equilibrium strategy 
such that various stakeholders are better off through giving consent to the contract. 
III　The Impact of Intercorporate Shareholdings
　For expositional ease, n firms, which are identical in expected profitability and/or state, enter the 
reciprocal shareholding contracts.  The setting employed here conforms to Osano (1996) and it is 
assumed that every member firm equally holds 1/(n− 1)  of newly issued equity shares of other n− 1
firms for the contract.  Assuming further that the fraction of newly issued shares to those outstanding is !, 
the equity positions of managers and the raider are diluted to (1− ω)α  and (1− ω)β  respectively.  Given 
the homogeneity of the fundamental features among member firms, any type of cash transfers will not 
occur, because the market value of each firm, defined V (a)  depends on the strategy a ∈ {M, S} , but 
under intercorporate shareholding contracts, the firms are supposed to select the same entrenchment 
strategy M, leading to the same value V (M)  subject to the condition k.  The cash needed to purchase 
ωV (M)  is thus financed by the receipt in exchange for the issuance of shares worth ωV (M)  to the rest of 
members.  If the managerial ownership, together with intercorporate ownership occupies majority of the 
firm’s outstanding shares, takeover is not feasible: (1− ω)α+ ω > 0.5 .  Of course this constraint may 
appear too binding to encourage the raider’s participation into the game, but since such an arrangement is 
of great use for abstracting from the stringent condition that should be fulfilled in the equilibrium, it is 
assumed to always hold in the subsequent analysis. 
　In this setting, consider the sufficient condition for such intercorporate shareholding contracts to be 
agreed between managers and the raider.  The participation constraints require all the agents be better off 
in the payoffs under the cross ownership regime, when the payoffs of managers and the raider respectively 
follow as
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　　　　　WM = (1− ω)αV (M) + λ(1− πM )SM,k , (6a)
and
　　　　　WR = (1− ω)βV (M). (6b)
On the other hand, the payoffs, when agents do not agree with the contracts and the condition shown in 
lemma 2 is met6), are respectively given by
　　　　　WM  = GS  = απS [S + (σg − σb)∆S ] , (7a)
and
　　　　　WR = βπS [S + (σg − σb)∆S ] . (7b)
Now, it is easy to confirm that the conditions sufficient for managers and the raider to agree with the 
contracts have to meet
　　　　　WM  = απS [S + (σg − σb)∆S ] ≤ (1− ω)αV (M) + λ(1− πM )SMk =WM , (8a)
and
　　　　　WR = βπS [S + (σg − σb)∆S ] ≤ (1− ω)βV (M) =WR . (8b)
Recall that the market value V (M)  coincides among member firms, and since it is written as
　　　　　V (M) =
σgRM,g + σbRM,b
1− ω
,
then the inequality (8a) reduces to
　　　　　απS [S + (σg − σb)∆S ] ≤ [λ+ (α− λ)πM ][S + (σg − σb)∆M ] , (9a)
and similarly, (8b) to
　　　　　 βπS [S + (σg − σb)∆S ] ≤ βπM [S + (σg − σb)∆M ]. (9b)
These conditions yield the following proposition. 
Proposition 1.  Given assumptions (1)-(3), there exists a level of revenue allocation rate π∗M ≥ πM  that 
satisfies both managers’ and the raider’s participation constraints, (9a) and (9b), where managers are willing 
to agree with reciprocal shareholding contracts regardless of any parametric realization regarding ® and ¸. 
The raider takes part in the intercorporate shareholding contracts if and only if π∗M  satisfies:
　　　　　πM <
S −∆S
S −∆M
πS ≤ π∗M ≤
S +∆S
S +∆M
πS  (10)
In particular, when the state b is more likely than state g, i.e., σg < σb , managers have to commit to 
maintaining the allocation rate at least commensurate with [(S −∆S)/(S −∆M )]πS > πM  that warrants 
shareholders what exceeds or is equivalent to the normal returns Rf . 
Proof.  To prove the proposition, the expression (9a) is rewritten in the form of
　　　　　λ(1− πM )(S +∆M )− α[(πS − πM )S + (σg − σb)(πS∆S − πM∆M )]
As is immediately known from algebraic computation, if the second term is null irrespective of the 
magnitude of α , the expression is nonnegative for any value of ¸7). 
Next, from (9b) the raider’s participation constraint is rewritten as
　　　　　 β[(πM − πS)S + (σg − σb)(πM∆M − πS∆S)] ≥ 0 ,
that requires the reduction in the raider’s expected claims for both sales and sales volatility following 
strategic change from M to S be compensated, while there is no means but increasing the revenue 
allocation rate sufficiently to obtain the raider’s approval for the contracts.  Such is achieved by warranting 
π∗M  instead of πM  such that,
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　　　　　π∗M ≥
S + (σg − σb)∆S
S + (σg − σb)∆M
πS ,
where inside the square bracket of the above expression is nonnegative regardless of the sign of the 
difference in each state occurrence probability.  Finally, suppose that σg − σb ≤ 0 , in particular an extreme 
case of σg − σb = −1 , where π∗M  equals [(S −∆S)/(S −∆M )]πS .  This is the case in which bad states 
dominate the good one and thus it is confirmed that the returns from managerial entrenchment strategy 
M, πM ∗(S −∆M ) = πS(S −∆S) = RS,b > Rf  that is direct from the assumption (3).  Note that the 
upper bound of π∗M , [(S +∆S)/(S +∆M )]πS > πS  gives a solution for (πS − πM )S + (σg − σb)・
(πS∆S − πM∆M ) = 0, so πS = π
∗
M  also satisfies management participation constraint regardless of the 
relation between ® and ¸. 
 Q. E. D. 
The proposition contains relevant features in explaining currently observed phenomena toward 
reestablishing the extensive intercorporate shareholding among Japanese business firms.  To avoid hostile 
takeovers, managers prefer a significant fraction of shares be in hands of those with familiar relationships. 
Yet the lower revenue allocation under managerial entrenchment provides the raider with little incentive to 
hold the firm’s equity instead of exerting pressure on managers.  Obviously, the tradeoff associated with 
mutual shareholding contracts is to some extent resolved by enhancing the raider’s gain, but now in turn 
to what extent the allocation rate is allowed to increase without largely hurting managerial interests should 
be addressed. 
　As long as λ/α < 1 holds, the condition (9a) is seemingly met for any value of π∗M .  That means 
managers relatively prefer gains from their equity position to those from the arbitrary use of firm 
resources, as directly confirmed by lemma 2.  Casual arguments state that managerial ownership mitigates 
agency problems through the alignment effect, and if this is the case, the increase in ® is expected to 
improve the viability of equilibrium.  To see this, let us prepare for the incentive compatibility constraints. 
Managers decide to remain in the blocking shareholding contracts when the payoffs from doing so 
exceed those from accepting tender offers from the potential raider.  Straying from the agreed upon terms 
implicit in the contracts, i.e., never to sell the members’ shares to the raider, induces a retaliation deal of 
equity positions held by the rest of members in the concerned firm.  Whether to violate the contracts thus 
depends on the opportunity costs incurred to the firm losing protection against hostile takeovers. 
　Recall that the market value of each member firm is denoted as V (a)  for a ∈ {M,S}.  As the number of 
outstanding shares is diluted by intercorporate shareholding, so is the fundamental of V (a) , written as 
(1− ω)−1Ra,k .  While the tender offer price may be higher than the fundamental, it is determined in view 
of the raider’s maximization problem.  Denote the price as Zk  for k ∈ {g, b}
8), and the accompanying costs 
as C.  The raider attempts external takeovers if
　　　　　0.5Zk − (0.5− β)Zk − C ≥ βRa,k . 
The first term in the left-hand side of the inequality represents gains from holding half of the firm’s total 
shares given the realization of takeovers and replacement of incumbent managers, whereas the second and 
third term subtracted from gains are the total costs to grasp the firm’s control.  The inequality reduces to
　　　　　β(Zk −Ra,k)− C ≥ 0 , (11)
that indicates the difference between the net takeover gain for the raider and the cost at which tender 
offers are made.  To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the condition (11) is satisfied only when 
managers undertake the entrenchment strategy, i.e., a =M .  This assumption completes the task for 
deriving the management maximization problem, that is
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　　　　　max {α,ω} (1− ω)V (a) + λ (1− πa)Sa,k , (12)
subject to (1− ω)α+ ω > 0.5 .  The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in which all the 
agents are strictly better off under the intercorporate shareholding contracts. 
Proposition 2.  Given the assumptions (1)-(3), there exists intercorporate shareholdings equilibrium in 
which all the agents are better off by agreeing with the contracts.  The equilibrium is attained if all of the 
following statements are simultaneously satisfied:
(a) The revenue allocation rate π∗M , that increases in the success probability σg , is always greater than πM  
prevailing under managerial entrenchment. 
(b) A significant part of profit given up by managers in the bargaining of π∗M  is recovered by increasing their 
own equity position ®. 
(c) The greater return expected from the success of external takeover makes it difficult for managers to 
maintain cross shareholding, but such difficulty is mitigated by decreasing their equity position ®. 
(d) The stability of the business relationship between member firms facilitates cross shareholding in the bad 
state, but not in the good state. 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
The proposition again emphasizes the essential part of proposition 1, that is, to draw the raider’s attention, 
managers have to allocate more revenue to shareholders to the extent that does not largely reduce 
managers’ gains.  In doing so, managers get back some of what they lost by arranging the fraction of equity 
holding.  No matter what the initial equity position ® and independent of the specific private benefit ¸, 
incremental ownership aligns the interests between management and shareholders that tend to diverge 
and incur agency costs.  Contrarily, the strength of the raider’s motivation toward external takeovers, 
together with the fraction of managerial ownership possibly results in large opportunity costs associated 
with the rejection of tender offers, which would otherwise enhance total payoffs of incumbent managers. 
These findings enter into the core of the explanation for currently emerging phase of intercorporate 
shareholdings that is consistent with the efficient monitoring from shareholders.  Further, it is necessary 
to recognize that another key to understanding the role of intercorporate shareholding is revenue 
persistence that is characterized in the model as the state contingent volatility of annual sales.   The proof 
of the proposition demonstrates that the partial derivative of the smallest value of λ/α  with respect to ∆M  
obtains a positive sign and consequently shows that the marginal reduction in sales volatility effectively 
curtails the threshold that λ/α  should exceed to attain the equilibrium.  Risk-averse managers would 
prefer relatively small but more stable revenues to potential big money subject to the extreme risk.  In this 
sense, the central role of intercorporate shareholding leads to the risk hedge for the volatile revenue 
realization and it is straightforward that the relevance of risk hedge function manifests itself more 
prominently in bad states than in good states. 
IV　Conclusion
　This paper has shown that in the presence of takeover threats the intercorporate shareholding holds as a 
result of every agent ’s optimization behavior, conditional on the managerial commitments to always 
maintaining the revenue allocation higher than would be realized under the entrenchment strategy.  An 
agency cost is embedded in terms of revenue allocation between managers and shareholders, and it is 
conspicuous when entrenched managers could acquire private benefits from the incumbent control of the 
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firm.  Despite this problem, pursuit of private benefit in the form of relatively stable sales revenue and 
lower allocation under reciprocal holdings is consistent with equilibrium if an additional arrangement is 
made so that shareholder’s gain at least equal to the normal returns is warranted.  This arrangement 
however forces managers to surrender some fraction of their gains in exchange for the raider’s approval to 
intercorporate shareholding contracts.  The other arrangement to accomplish equilibrium puts focus on 
managerial ownership that compensates for some of losses associated with the higher revenue allocation 
to shareholders or the rejection of potentially beneficial tender offers.  Anyhow, under certain conditions 
the intercorporate shareholding can enhance welfare of all the agents: for managers external takeovers are 
stringently restricted and stabilized revenue via fixed transactions helps avoiding risks of having access to 
unknown business partners and for shareholders minimum level of returns will be ensured even in the bad 
states.  The findings presented here give plausible explanations for the currently observed rise in cross 
shareholding from the viewpoint of shareholders’ wealth.  The criticisms that unconditionally preclude the 
intercorporate shareholding thus lack relevance. 
　Some comments are made to address future research opportunities.  The accounting literature has 
explored the relation between ownership structure and accounting information and the specific ownership 
structure including cross shareholding turns out to result in idiosyncratic informational properties.  On the 
other hand, there is less attention to the theoretical model amplifying the role of accounting information 
per se in explaining the causes of ownership structure formation.  The approach taken in this paper is one 
of such attempts, but it is insufficient to dynamically describe the valuation impact of ownership structure 
because the term structure is too simple and the firm’s strategic decision is unrealistically limited.  Some 
technical elaboration would be required to refine the model. 
Appendix
　This appendix provides the proof of the proposition 2. 
First, the incentive compatibility constraint for managers to be engaged in cross ownership is proven.  If 
they reject the tender offers from the raider, their payoff from ongoing projects remains (6a), i.e.,
　　　　　YM =WM =(1−ω)αV (M)+λ(1−πM )SM,k=απMSM,k+λ(1−πM )SM,k=[λ+(α−λ)πM ]SM,k . 
Recall that from proposition 1 the participation constraint requires πM  be replaced by π
∗
M  as is expressed 
in (10) to involve the raider in the intercorporate shareholding contracts.  Consequently, the managers’ 
payoff becomes
　　　　　YM = [λ+ (α− λ)πM∗]SM,k . 
Contrarily, if managers accept tender offers, the corresponding payoff is presented by
　　　　　YM  = (1− ω)α[Zk + ωPa,k] ,
where ωPa,k  is the proceeds from the sale of member firms’ shares at the tendering prices.  Note that in 
this case the firm is taken over because all other member firms accept tender offers and liquidate their 
position in the violating firm.  Given the homogeneity of each member firm’s profitability, it can be written 
as Pa,k = Zk + ωPa,k , that is reduced to Pa,k = (1− ω)−1Zk .  Taking the difference between YM  and 
YM   yields the sufficient condition as
　　　　　[λ+ (α− λ)π∗M ]SM,k − αZk
　　　　　= λ(1− π∗M )− α[Zk − π
∗
M (S + (σg − σb)∆M )] ≥ 0
As is directly verified, this condition is satisfied if
　　　　　 λ
α
≥
Zk − π∗M [S + (σg − σb)∆M ]
(1− π∗M ) [S + (σg − σb)∆M ]
, (A1)
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and confirm that participation constraints (9a) and (9b) are met under π∗M . 
　Differentiate the right-hand side of (A1) with respect to π∗M , Zk , and ∆M , and the following 
inequalities obtain
　　　　　
∂ [·]
∂π∗M
= 1
(1− π∗M )
2

Zk
S + (σg − σb)∆M
− 1

< 0 , (A2)
　　　　　
∂ [·]
∂Zk
= 1
(1− π∗M ) [S + (σg − σb)∆M ]
> 0 , (A3)
　　　　　
∂ [·]
∂∆M
=
− (σg − σb)Zk
(1− π∗M ) [S + (σg − σb)∆M ]
2 . (A4)
(A2) reveals the negative effects of incremental revenue allocation to shareholders on the hurdles in 
forming intercorporate shareholding.  As the right-hand side of inequality (A l) decreases, the incentive 
compatibility constraint remains satisfied even if managers invest more in their own equity positions ®, i.e., 
the left-hand side decreases.  Holding the proportion of available private benefit ¸ fixed, managerial gain 
expressed in (6a) increases in ®, and thus part (b) of the proposition is proven.  Likewise, (A3) indicates 
that as long as the returns from external takeovers overwhelm those from ongoing strategy, the increase in 
former returns results in more stringent obstacles to enter into cross shareholding.  Such obstacles are 
partially excluded by decreasing ®, as is mentioned in part (c) of the proposition.  On the other hand, the 
sign of (A4) is not obvious, depending on the state probability.  When state g is more likely to occur than b, 
then σg − σb > 0  and the sign of (A4) is negative, and vice versa.  This is what part (d) of the proposition 
mentions and completes the proof. 
 Q. E. D. 
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Notes
１）There is a large body of studies that analyze the monitoring role played by the block shareholders.  For example, 
Admati et al. (1994) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) report that the existence of block holders is positively evaluated 
by other diversified shareholders because the effective monitoring takes place albeit the free-rider problems.  Yet 
the focus should be put on what kind of block holders take in charge of monitoring.  As Lichtenberg and Pushner 
(1994) empirically point out, when other business firms are dominant shareholders of a particular firm, the 
productivity and financial performance of the firm virtually under control of these block holders deteriorate 
remarkably.  This paper concerns whether mutual shareholding enhances the agents’ welfare regardless of the 
monitoring function. 
２）For the detailed data of time-series changes in the fraction of mutual shareholding, see NLI Research Institute 
(2004).  The data deals with not only one-way shareholding but also completely reciprocal shareholding.  It is not 
available since 2004, when the final press release as of fiscal year 2003 was published.  According to Nikkei Shimbun 
(26/09/07), the long-term securities held by listed business firms sum up to ￥28 trillion, about 5.3% of the 
aggregate market capitalization of Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
３）The mimeo is available upon request from the author.  The intriguing finding thereof is that the first order 
autoregressive coefficient (AR) of annual sales is higher when the equity position of other business firms is 
relatively large compared with when it is relatively small. 
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４）An implicit assumption is imposed on the risk preference of agents: managers are risk averse whereas shareholders 
are risk neutral.  Due to this assumption, risk free cash flow can be seen as the minimum return for shareholders. 
Of course even if shareholders are also risk averse, a minor change from Rf  to some measure of cost of equity 
capital does not substantially alter the results. 
５）While there is no explicit role endowed with other diversified investors for expositional ease, their equity position in 
the firm does not exceed 1− α− β .  The analysis precludes the free-rider problem that these investors incur 
because they can become the raider whenever they want, and thus without loss of generality focuses on the 
disciplinary role of the potential raider. 
６）This reservation is made only to simplify the analysis.  If the condition suggested in lemma 2 is not satisfied, 
WM  = GM  > GS   and inequality (8a) is harder to hold in this situation.  But since this modification will not 
substantially change the result, in order not to complicate the discussion, such a situation is discarded. 
７）Note that πM∗  when σg − σb = 1  exceeds πS  and possibly deprives managers of all of their private benefits, i.e., 
λ = 0 .  Even in this case, confirm that the inequality (9a) still holds. 
８）The tender offer price Zk  is set to the maximum value that would be attained if external takeovers succeed and the 
incumbent managers are replaced.  It is also assumed that there is no possibility of such takeovers, the purpose of 
which centers on the prompt sale of the firm’s assets that are evaluated under the book values. 
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